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ABSTRACT: It is well known that philosophical hermeneutics has long been associated in political 
discussions with a conservative orientation. Many Gadamerians have sought to rebut this 
suggestion, convincingly emphasizing progressive political dimensions of hermeneutics in general 
and of Gadamer’s thought in particular. One version of the association of hermeneutics with 
conservatism has been overlooked, however, namely, Hans Blumenberg’s provocative claim that 
the predilection in the hermeneutic tradition for metaphors of hearing and listening indicates 
that hermeneutics passively heeds and takes in tradition as we would unwillingly receive a loud 
sound, and is thereby politically conservative. This paper critically responds to Blumenberg’s 
critique of what I call the conservatism of listening, and aims to interrogate the extent to which 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics can be characterized by this form of conservatism. Through a 
consideration of ocular metaphors in Gadamer’s thinking, we will discover in Gadamerian 
hermeneutics a conception of dynamic, constructive, and embodied engagement with historical 
traditions that makes room for critique. In this way, Gadamer avoids the charge of adhering to 
the conservatism of listening. 
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Hermeneutics no longer enjoys the preeminent status it did around the end of the 
Cold War, when Gianni Vattimo pronounced it the “koiné or common idiom of 
Western culture.”1 At a time when history seemed at an end and liberal 
democracy decisively victorious, the thesis that all claims to truth can be reduced 
to mere interpretation appeared eminently attractive, at least according to the 
 
1 Gianni Vattimo, Beyond Interpretation: The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy, trans. D. Webb, Stanford, 
CA, Stanford University Press, 1997, p. 1. 
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“postmodern” version of hermeneutics advocated by Vattimo, because it could 
provide the proper normative framework for diverse, cosmopolitan societies 
governed by global capitalism. Indeed, the most influential modern paradigm of 
hermeneutics, namely, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s, has been haunted by suspicions 
concerning its alleged association with conservative and reactionary politics ever 
since Jürgen Habermas’s landmark review of Truth and Method. For many readers, 
Habermas’s claim that “Gadamer is motivated by the conservatism of that first 
generation, by the impulse of a Burke that has not yet been turned against the 
rationalism of the eighteenth century” has remained basically decisive.2 Santiago 
Zabala, for example, takes as his point of departure in a recent essay the fact that 
“[Heidegger’s] understanding of hermeneutics is more radical, anarchic, and 
progressive than…Gadamer’s conservative hermeneutics.”3 In an age when 
philosophy faces the demand to think such pressing issues as the eschatological 
specter of climate change, what use have we today for a seemingly conservative 
philosophical perspective that emphasizes the authority of tradition and the 
recovery of the arts and humanities? Does not hermeneutics seem particularly 
out of step with a time that requires radical politics and practical solutions? 
Over the last several decades, however, many Gadamerians have sought to 
rebut the stubborn perception of hermeneutics as conservative, persuasively 
emphasizing progressive political dimensions of hermeneutics in general and of 
Gadamer’s thinking in particular.4 Even if it no longer counts as the intellectual 
 
2 Jürgen Habermas, “A Review of Gadamer’s Truth and Method,” trans. F. Dallmayr and T. McCarthy, 
Understanding and Social Inquiry, F. Dallmayr and T. McCarthy (eds.), Notre Dame, IN, University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1977, p. 357. For an historical overview of the development and reception of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics, see David Liakos and Theodore George, “Hermeneutics in Post-War Continental European 
Philosophy,” The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015, K. Becker and I. Thomson (eds.), Cambridge and 
New York, Cambridge University Press, pp. 399-415. 
3 Santiago Zabala, “Being at Large: The Only Emergency Is the Lack of Events,” Being Shaken: Ontology and 
the Event, M. Marder and S. Zabala (eds.), New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 77. 
4 See works by Linda Martín Alcoff (“Gadamer’s Feminist Epistemology,” Feminist Interpretations of Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, L. Code (ed.), University Park, PA, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003, pp. 231-258); 
Theodore George (“The Promise of World Literature,” Internationales Jahrbuch für Hermeneutik, vol. 13, 2014, 
pp. 128-143); Paul Healy (“Making Policy Debate Matter: The Hermeneutic Dimension,” Cosmos and History, 
vol. 10, no. 2, 2014, pp. 278-299); Cynthia R. Nielsen (“Gadamer and Scholz on Solidarity: Disclosing, 
Avowing, and Performing Solidaristic Ties with Human and Natural Others,” Journal of the British Society for 
Phenomenology, vol. 48, no. 3, 2017, pp. 240-256); Tsenay Serequeberhan (Existence and Heritage: Hermeneutic 
Explorations in African and Continental Philosophy, Albany, NY, SUNY Press, 2015, pp. 44-50, 73-97); Charles 
Taylor (“Gadamer on the Human Sciences,” The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer, R. Dostal (ed.), Cambridge 
and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 126-142); Georgia Warnke (“Solidarity and Tradition 
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idiom of our culture, hermeneutics still remains, thanks in part to those efforts, 
one of contemporary philosophy’s main theoretical orientations. Here in this 
paper, I shall contribute to the ongoing debate about the political contours of 
Gadamerian hermeneutics in an avowed attempt to bolster the political viability 
of that tradition. Specifically, I will do so by engaging with an overlooked version 
of the attempt to associate hermeneutics with conservatism, namely, Hans 
Blumenberg’s provocative claim that the pervasiveness in the hermeneutic 
tradition of metaphors of hearing and listening indicates that hermeneutics too 
readily heeds tradition and is thereby politically reactionary. This paper will first 
explain, and then critically respond to, Blumenberg’s critique of what I call the 
conservatism of  listening, and aims ultimately to interrogate the extent to which 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics can be identified with this form of conservatism. I will 
initially motivate Blumenberg’s characterization of the conservatism of listening 
with reference to the genuinely “traditionalistic hermeneutics” of Alasdair 
MacIntyre and Michael Oakeshott as well as some passages from Gadamer. But 
I shall then complicate and contest Blumenberg’s critique of hermeneutics by 
reconstructing three ocular metaphors in Gadamer’s thinking that show how 
Gadamerian hermeneutics is far from oriented only, or even primarily, around 
metaphors of hearing and listening. The paper ends with a consideration of 
Gadamer’s claim that we can learn how to listen properly to tradition. Blumenberg 
was right to think that there is such a thing as a conservatism of listening, but this 
characterization cannot encompass the full extent of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. 
Providing a Gadamerian reply to Blumenberg’s critique of the conservatism of 
listening will permit us to develop a unique and convincing political defense, and 
extension, of hermeneutical thinking. 
§1. BLUMENBERG’S CRITIQUE OF HERMENEUTICS 
Reducing Hans Blumenberg to the status of a critic of hermeneutics does not do 
justice to the fact that he counts, in my view, as one of the most original thinkers 
in recent European philosophy, as is increasingly being recognized in Germany.5 
 
in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics,” History and Theory, vol. 51, no. 4, 2012, pp. 6-22); and Gail Weiss (Refiguring the 
Ordinary, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2008, pp. 99, 116-117). 
5 See Kurt Flasch, Hans Blumenberg: Philosoph in Deutschland: Die Jahre 1945 bis 1966, Frankfurt, V. Klostermann, 
2017. 
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But one valence of his originality emerges in a highly critical, albeit veiled, 
discussion of hermeneutics. The claim that philosophical hermeneutics counts as 
inherently conservative usually takes its point of departure, as in the passages 
from Habermas and Zabala cited above, from Gadamer’s treatment of our 
limited ability to critically reflect on and overcome authority and prejudice. 
Gadamerian hermeneutics, these readers suggest, encourages a reactionary 
observance and acceptance of tradition. Blumenberg approaches this same 
general theme from the unique point of view of his analysis of the employment 
by hermeneutical thinking in general (though not by Gadamer in particular) of 
metaphors of hearing and listening. Blumenberg claims that the purportedly anti-
ocular orientation of hermeneutics opens that tradition up to a serious political 
problem: 
Metaphors of “hearing” are also significant for grasping the phenomenon of 
tradition…In judging the value of tradition, a teleological moment is always implied, 
namely, that “truth” is intended for man and that it is for that reason that it reaches 
him via the precarious stream of cultural transference. The denial of vision that is 
entailed in listening to tradition always includes an element of teleological trust that 
“theoretically” cannot be justified. For this reason, in the attitude of “hearing” (i.e., 
in being dependent on tradition), there is often a hidden insufficiency.6 
This passage, rich with criticisms of hermeneutics but elliptical in its articulation 
of them, invites close attention. First, Blumenberg implies that an orientation 
toward auditory and aural metaphors entails a “denial of vision.” In other words, 
the auditory and the visual are mutually exclusive as governing metaphorical 
fields. That ultimately untenable disjunction collapses, I shall argue, in 
Gadamer’s case. Second, Blumenberg suggests that metaphors of listening and 
hearing go hand in hand with a conservative acceptance of, and even obedience 
toward, tradition. Blumenberg, in effect, likens the passive acceptance of tradition 
to feeling overwhelmed by a particularly loud sound. Listening to a loud sound 
that you cannot stop yourself from hearing is not the same as assenting to hearing 
that sound, let alone judging the sound aesthetically pleasing or rationally 
 
6 Hans Blumenberg, “Light as a Metaphor for Truth: At the Preliminary Stage of Philosophical Concept 
Formation,” trans. J. Anderson. Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision, D. Levin (ed.), Berkeley and Los Angeles, 
University of California Press, 1993, pp. 48-49. Lest this passage from Blumenberg be thought too 
idiosyncratic or singular, another version of this same type of criticism, this time more explicitly directed at 
Heidegger and Gadamer, is also offered by Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy 
of German Literary Theory, London, Routledge, 1997, pp. 285-286. 
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subscribing to its discursive content. The purported link between listening and 
conservatism follows, then, from the phenomenological—albeit disputable, as we 
shall later see—claim that we cannot control what we hear; we are, this argument 
controversially suggests, passively at the mercy of sound. Furthermore, in a quite 
general repudiation of conservative thinking, Blumenberg suggests here that this 
acceptance of tradition cannot be justified, and even hints that such an 
acceptance would be ipso facto irrational. For Blumenberg, then, auditory and 
aural metaphors at bottom imply a fundamentally passive and conservative 
reception of tradition—a conservatism of listening. To the extent that 
hermeneutics encourages us to listen to the past, then, like all modes of hearing, 
this perceptual act of merely listening to and passively taking in the truths of 
tradition will in the end dissuade us from dynamically reflecting on and critically 
engaging with the past. Though Blumenberg’s paper was published in 1957, 
meaning that this passage was likely not directed at Gadamer per se (since 
Gadamer published the systematic statement of his hermeneutics, Truth and 
Method, in 1960), this critique certainly might be seen as applicable to Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics in particular, since his philosophical conception of listening does, 
as we shall soon see, suggest a positive stance toward tradition.  
These appear to be powerful and potentially far-reaching criticisms. In the 
remainder of this paper, Blumenberg’s critique, which richly deserves the 
attention of researchers in hermeneutics, will frame my discussion, but I will 
complicate his reading in numerous ways and will by no means accept his 
characterization either of hermeneutics or of human perception. Blumenberg’s 
argument implies that Gadamer’s predominantly auditory hermeneutics 
encourages us to conservatively heed the call of tradition. What if Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics were not, in fact, anti-ocular, however? As I will indicate, his 
writings, like those of other hermeneutical thinkers, contain numerous auditory 
metaphors and motifs. But, as I shall emphasize, Blumenberg’s suggestion that 
metaphors of listening and seeing can only compete with one another simply does 
not stand up to scrutiny—either on purely phenomenological grounds, as I will 
briefly suggest, or, more importantly for our purposes here, as a reading of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics.7 In fact, I will show that, alongside the aural and 
 
7 Georgia Warnke’s thesis that, in developing a mode of “social and ethical perception,” Gadamer’s thought 
is compatible with ocular metaphors helped inspire my argument here (“Ocularcentrism and Social 
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auditory elements of his thinking, Gadamer also retrieves numerous important 
metaphors that are crucially ocular in orientation. I hope ultimately to show that 
this overlooked ocular register of Gadamer’s thought rebuts Blumenberg’s 
misguided critique of the auditory conservatism of hermeneutics. To the extent 
that Gadamer’s hermeneutics is not hostile to the ocular, I shall argue, his position 
will avoid Blumenberg’s charge of conservatism. As we shall see, responding to 
the political objection to hermeneutics that is represented by this passage from 
Blumenberg will ultimately reveal a new and suggestive means of mounting a 
political defense of hermeneutics rooted in the richly varied perceptual 
metaphors that Gadamer employs. 
§2. TRADITIONALISTIC HERMENEUTICS 
But before defending Gadamer from Blumenberg’s critique, I want first to 
motivate the real insight of Blumenberg’s association of the auditory and aural 
dimensions of hermeneutics with conservatism with reference to two writers, 
Michael Oakeshott and Alasdair MacIntyre, who advance versions of what I shall 
call traditionalistic hermeneutics. Characterizing this form of hermeneutical thought 
will permit us to develop an even stronger subsequent defense of Gadamerian 
hermeneutics, one that directly takes on Blumenberg’s critique. By 
“traditionalistic hermeneutics,” I mean philosophies of interpretation and 
understanding that tend toward a politics of the conservation of tradition in the 
form of either the rejuvenation of a pre-modern tradition (MacIntyre) or an 
affirmation of an existing tradition (Oakeshott).8 We turn first to MacIntyre, 
whom we should certainly acknowledge as an ideologically heterogeneous 
thinker whose own political activities and writings, in the course of his long 
 
Criticism,” Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision, D. Levin (ed.), Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of 
California Press, 1993, p. 289). 
8 An account of MacIntyre and Oakeshott that is consonant with (though not identical to) my own here can 
be found in Mark T. Mitchell’s recent enlistment of these two philosophers into his model of the cultural 
conservation and maintenance of tradition and the development of a corresponding right-wing “critique of 
the liberal self” (The Limits of Liberalism: Tradition, Individualism, and the Crisis of Freedom, Notre Dame, IN, 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2019, p. 199). In their study of communitarian political theory, Stephen 
Mulhall and Adam Swift also identified MacIntyre, in particular, as an anti-modern thinker: “Despite 
important shifts in the critique of liberal political theorizing in his later writings, MacIntyre still cleaves to 
the almost-apocalyptic vision of modern moral culture with which After Virtue is imbued” (Liberals and 
Communitarians, Second Edition, Malden, MA, Blackwell, 1996, p. 101).  
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career, have often made him an ally of radical left-wing political practice and an 
opponent of capitalism. But for our particular purposes here, MacIntyre’s 
thinking counts as hermeneutically traditionalistic insofar as he articulates, first, 
a harshly negative critique of the modern age, which he identifies with “a 
multiplication of rival standpoints concerning a wide range of subject matters, 
none of them able to provide the resources for their own final vindication and the 
overthrow of their competitors.”9 MacIntyre criticizes modernity for its inherent 
inability to develop a neutral and rational framework with which to definitively 
settle moral, political, epistemic, and philosophical disputes, which accounts for 
the seemingly endless struggles across modern culture to reach consensus about 
such diverse controversies as abortion or epistemology. Because we lack a single 
vocabulary with which to adjudicate these debates, we moderns, whether we 
admit it or not, will always find ourselves unable to escape the quicksand of 
relativism.  
The goal of a complete and neutral framework, which modern philosophy 
has quixotically but misguidedly pursued, is for MacIntyre impossible because 
“without…a pre-rational commitment, no reason will count as a good reason.”10 
This reference to the need for “a pre-rational commitment” suggests not only 
MacIntyre’s well-known Catholic faith, but also his thesis that human beings are 
(as per the title of his 1999 book) “dependent rational animals.” This recognition 
of our vulnerability recalls Blumenberg’s reference to the “hidden insufficiency” 
always implied in hermeneutical accounts of the human relationship to tradition. 
According to MacIntyre, our irreducible human vulnerability includes our 
embeddedness within a social fabric of dialogue and conversation in which we 
communally shape our intelligible worlds by giving and asking for reasons. In a 
manner again reminiscent of Blumenberg’s discussion of hermeneutics, 
MacIntyre describes our human quest for intelligibility through metaphors of the 
voice and of dialogue. He suggests that, in my immature phase of moral 
development, before I have fully developed my practical reason, “I am not a 
voice, but an echo. I still have to learn to speak with my own voice.”11 The full 
 
9 Alasdair MacIntyre, “Relativism, Power, and Philosophy,” After Philosophy: End or Transformation?, K. 
Baynes, J. Bohman, T. McCarthy (eds.), Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1987, p. 402. 
10 Ibid, p. 405. 
11 Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, Chicago and La Salle, 
Open Court, 1999, p. 148. 
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development of human practical reason, developed through conversation in 
which we cooperatively and dialogically achieve a sense of rationality, will include 
my recognition of my dependence and reliance on my fellow human beings: “In 
achieving accountability we will have learned not only how to speak to, but also 
how to speak for the other.”12 MacIntyre construes the human condition of 
vulnerable dependence and interconnectedness in terms of conversation, 
dialogue, and the voice. 
We are now in a position to grasp why I categorize MacIntyre here as a 
traditionalistic hermeneutical philosopher. He begins with a critique of 
modernity’s dangerously excessive pluralism of modes of justification, which 
inevitably leads to a state of relativism. Armed with this pessimistic and critical 
diagnosis of the modern age, he then develops an account of human vulnerability 
and dependency, which for him imply our need to engage in conversation by 
which we collaboratively achieve practical reason and develop our own voice. 
Blumenberg’s astute critique of metaphors of hearing and listening in 
hermeneutics anticipated why MacIntyre, who avowedly rejects the modern age’s 
autonomous and secular rationality in favor of emphasizing our finite 
dependence on tradition, would reach for metaphors of the voice and of dialogue. 
We also discern this preference for auditory metaphors in traditionalistic 
hermeneutics even more clearly in Oakeshott’s image of human culture as “the 
conversation of mankind,” our second example of the conservatism of listening: 
“As civilized human beings, we are the inheritors, neither of an inquiry about 
ourselves and the world, nor of an accumulating body of information, but of a 
conversation, begun in the primeval forests and extended and made more 
articulate in the course of centuries. It is a conversation which goes on both in 
public and within each of ourselves.”13 Oakeshott conceives of human civilization 
as an endless and playful conversation between different “voices,” or modes of 
human expression, including politics, science, and poetry, although “none has 
natural superiority, let alone primacy.”14 The ongoing, infinite interchange 
between these competing but never wholly dominant voices takes place without 
goal, objective, or endpoint. The hermeneutical motif of conversation as a 
 
12 Ibid, p. 150. 
13 Michael Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, London, Methuen, 1962, p. 199. 
14 Ibid, p. 241. 
 DAVID LIAKOS 503 
description of tradition, to which Blumenberg called attention in his reference to 
the hermeneutical emphasis on “the precarious stream of cultural transference,” 
prominently recurs in Oakeshott.  
Oakeshott’s conservatism operates here not in any overtly ideological 
register—since he vociferously denies that either politics or science should take 
precedence over poetry, or the imaginative arts, and he avowedly intends to halt 
the hierarchical ordering that modern culture imposes on our conversation—but 
rather within the ostensibly apolitical metaphor of conversation itself. He defines 
the conversation of mankind in terms of our common inheritance of culture. For 
Oakeshott, conversation names our reception and maintenance of tradition: 
“The greater part of what we have is not a burden to be carried or an incubus to 
be thrown off, but an inheritance to be enjoyed.”15 The metaphor of the 
conversation of mankind implies that we act as faithful stewards of a cultural 
tradition in which, through our contributions to the conversation, we participate 
and which we continue and, in turn, make our own. We keep our inheritance of 
a cultural tradition endlessly ongoing—without radical critique, rupture, or 
departure, but rather by merely receiving, extending, and deepening the 
conversation. Like MacIntyre’s employment of the metaphor of speaking with our 
own voice, Oakeshott’s conception of the conversation of mankind forms part of 
a traditionalistic hermeneutical philosophy that advocates, through aural and 
auditory metaphors, the conservation of tradition. Both Oakeshott and 
MacIntyre fall prey to, and thus also more fully exemplify in turn, what I am 
calling, following Blumenberg, the conservatism of listening. 
§3. GADAMER’S AUDITORY HERMENEUTICS 
I shall soon argue that neither of these versions of the conservatism of listening—
MacIntyre’s strongly negative critique of the relativism endemic to secular 
modernity, Oakeshott’s endless affirmation of our cultural inheritance—fully 
applies to or captures Gadamerian hermeneutics. These examples demonstrate, 
however, that Blumenberg was onto something in his reading of the conservatism 
of listening in hermeneutics. Blumenberg’s characterization of hermeneutics 
demands, then, a critical response. In order to provide the most convincing 
 
15 Ibid, p. 113. 
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possible Gadamerian reply to Blumenberg’s critique, I want initially to 
acknowledge the way Gadamer does, at times, seem, like MacIntyre and 
Oakeshott, to adhere to the conservatism of listening. In Martin Jay’s judgment, 
which echoes Blumenberg’s earlier discussion, “hermeneutic thinkers from 
Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey to Gadamer have trusted more in the word 
than the image.”16 Numerous features of Gadamer’s thinking lend themselves to 
this appraisal of his relationship to vision and the ocular, beginning with the 
obvious observation that hermeneutics traditionally refers to the study of the 
interpretation of texts. In its inextricable link with reading, hermeneutics involves, 
and indeed requires, careful hearing and listening. For Gadamer’s 
phenomenological hermeneutics of faith or trust, interpretation and 
understanding require above all listening faithfully and attentively to what some 
hermeneutic phenomenon, such as a text, has to say.17 This striking metaphorical 
model of hermeneutical understanding as a sort of listening suggests, perhaps, a 
hermeneutical preference for the ear over the eye. Gadamerian hermeneutics 
requires attentively listening to those phenomena that demand our 
understanding. 
Given his view of hermeneutics as involving a kind of faith or trust, Gadamer 
underscores “the primacy of hearing [as] the basis of the hermeneutical 
phenomenon.”18 Because he models hermeneutics on the metaphorical task of 
faithfully listening to what phenomena like texts have to say, Gadamer 
prominently identifies hermeneutics with our human faculties of and capacity for 
listening: “The hermeneutical experience also has its own rigor: that of 
uninterrupted [unbeirrbaren] listening.”19 Gadamer argues here that the demand to 
listen dutifully to the weight of the authority of the past, even when it appears 
 
16 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, University of California Press, 1994, p. 265. 
17 Paul Ricoeur famously distinguishes between the hermeneutics of suspicion, identified with Nietzsche, Marx, 
and Freud, on the one hand, and the hermeneutics of faith or trust, exemplified by phenomenology, on the other 
(Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. D. Savage, New Haven, CT and London, Yale 
University Press, 1970, pp. 20-36). Gadamer appears to accept the basic structure of Ricoeur’s well-known 
distinction (“The Hermeneutics of Suspicion,” Man and World, vol. 17, no. 3–4, 1984, pp. 312, 318). 
18 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, second revised edition, trans. J. Weinsheimer and D. Marshall, 
New York, Continuum, 2004, p. 458; Gessammelte Werke 1: Hermeneutik I. Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer 
philosophischen Hermeneutik, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1990, p. 466. Henceforth abbreviated as 
TM and GW1. I frequently modify translations of Gadamer’s texts from German into English. 
19 Ibid, p. 461; p. 469. 
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alienated from and foreign to us, is even more primordial than hermeneutical 
attention to written texts. This human openness to the past—on analogy with our 
auditory vulnerability to sound—predates, or at least is more elemental to human 
existence than, the historical innovation of the written word. Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics does justice to this fundamental, unavoidable, and indeed almost 
physiological need to hear what the history of human consciousness has to say. 
This model of a hermeneutics of faith or trust follows also from Gadamer’s 
conception of phenomenology as remaining “faithful to givenness.”20 
Phenomenological hermeneutics requires faithfully listening to the history that, 
in our facticity, we inevitably receive and to which we always remain open and 
even vulnerable. 
Listening metaphorically captures our unavoidable openness and receptivity 
to the past, a feature of hearing emphasized in another register by Hans Jonas’s 
phenomenology of the senses. As Jonas argues, seeing—which we to some extent 
control, not only when we willfully open and close our eyes, but also when we 
actively or spontaneously direct our sight toward what we positively desire to 
see—excludes the passivity or receptivity inherent to hearing.21 Just as our ears, 
when functioning correctly, are uncontrollably open to whatever sounds lie 
within range, so too are human beings always vulnerable to the transmissions of 
the past whose call we must hear. Gadamer also gestures toward this version of 
the apparent difference between modes of human perception when he proclaims 
“the priority of hearing over sight.”22 To the extent that hermeneutics names our 
attempt to understandingly come to grips with the past whose transmissions we 
must receive, then hearing, which is—only seemingly, as we shall see—always 
more open and receptive than vision, becomes the hermeneutically primary 
sense. Listening, when compared with vision, purportedly counts as the more 
receptive mode of human perception, and so evokes the proper connotation of 
dutifully and attentively listening to what tradition has to say. But, as I will now 
emphasize, these auditory figures do not exhaust Gadamer’s employment of 
concepts and motifs drawn from the full scope of human perception, a feature of 
 
20 Gadamer, “The Hermeneutics of Suspicion,” p. 318. 
21 Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology, Evanston, IL, Northwestern University 
Press, 2001, pp. 139-140. 
22 Gadamer, TM, p. 458; GW1, p. 466. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 506 
Gadamer’s work that belies any all too quick suggestion that his hermeneutics 
problematically ignores or overlooks the human body.23 
§4. GADAMER’S OCULAR METAPHORS 
Given these strongly auditory dimensions of Gadamer’s thinking, we might then 
suppose that Gadamer, like Oakeshott and MacIntyre, betrays his allegiance to 
the conservatism of listening. I will now defend Gadamer from this charge by 
responding, in particular, to Blumenberg’s reference to “the denial of vision that 
is entailed in listening to tradition.” I shall argue against Blumenberg’s 
characterization by drawing out three ocular metaphors operative in Gadamer’s 
thinking, which will go some length toward unearthing overlooked political 
valences of Gadamerian hermeneutics. The first metaphor I want to consider is 
infinity. Gadamer appeals to the figure of infinity at key moments throughout his 
corpus to underline the overall goal or ambition of his thinking: “I could, in fact, 
say, as a first determination of the site of my own effort at thinking, that I have 
taken it on myself to restore to a place of honor what Hegel termed ‘bad infinity 
[schlechten Unendlichkeit]’—but with a decisive modification, of course.”24 What is 
meant by the Hegelian “bad infinity”? For Hegel, infinity in this bad sense, 
exemplified by an infinite number line in mathematics, simply goes on and on 
without end (hence, “unendlich”), which underlines the concept’s ocular 
resonances.25 Hegelian dialectic seeks to capture an allegedly fuller and more 
conceptually faithful and positive understanding of the infinite as more than just 
the mere negation of finitude. Gadamer, meanwhile, professes to positively 
reclaim this idea of a process without end in his account of understanding as an 
ongoing dialogue. Gadamer rejects the possibility that understanding has a 
teleological end, such as in absolute knowing or settled scientific knowledge. For 
 
23 Here I follow the suggestion of Theodore George, “Birth Cry—Or, the Hermeneutics of Facticity, from 
the Finitude of Language to the Body in Pain,” Internationales Jahrbuch für Hermeneutik, vol. 17, 2018, pp. 110-
126. 
24 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Reflections on My Philosophical Journey,” trans. R. Palmer, The Philosophy of 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, L. Hahn (ed.), Chicago and La Salle, Open Court, 1997, p. 37; Gesammelte Werke 2: 
Hermeneutik II. Wahrheit und Methode: Ergänzugen, Register, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1993, p. 505. 
25 See Wayne Martin, “In Defense of Bad Infinity: A Fichtean Response to Hegel’s Differenzschrift,” Bulletin 
of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, vol. 28, no. 1–2, 2007, pp. 168-187. Compare also Robert B. Pippin, 
“Gadamer’s Hegel,” The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer, R. Dostal (ed.), Cambridge and New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 230. 
 DAVID LIAKOS 507 
that reason, he follows the later Heidegger in conceiving of thinking as never 
completed or consummated in the same way that a particularly rich, polysemic, 
or unpredictable conversation always remains ongoing. To that extent, 
understanding counts as endless or infinite. The Hegelian bad infinite provides 
Gadamer, then, with his central model for the endlessly ongoing dialogue 
between a person attempting to understand something and the object of their 
attention that we call human understanding. 
We should pay attention to the spatial resonances contained in Gadamer’s 
image of the infinity of understanding.26 He draws an important connection 
between the infinite dialogue of understanding and the modern concept of space: 
“The infinite perfectibility [unendliche Perfektibilität] of the human experience of the 
world means that, whatever language we use, we never succeed in seeing 
anything but an ever more extended aspect, a ‘view [Ansicht]’ of the world.”27 
Gadamer emphasizes here that language never allows us a complete view of the 
whole world, but only a partial (albeit genuine) glimpse into it. Language offers 
human speakers particular perspectives on or views of a vast reality that 
necessarily exceeds our finite comprehension and point of view. In a text from 
1990, Gadamer more explicitly connects this idea of language as a view on reality 
with the infinity of space as established by modern science: 
The world is there as a horizon. “Horizon” evokes the living experience we all 
know. The gaze [Blick] is directed to the infinite distance [Unendliche der Ferne], and 
this infinity [Unendliche] retreats from every effort, no matter how great. And at 
every speeding march, new horizons open up. In this sense, the world is a boundless 
space [grenzenloser Raum] for us that we are in the midst of and in which we seek our 
modest orientation.28 
We should hear in this passage’s reference to “boundless space” a distinct echo of 
modern scientific spatial infinity. Gadamer here phenomenologically describes, 
then, the way that the world that stands before our gaze can never be taken in 
with any single human glance. As we repeatedly shift and adjust our point of view, 
the fact of the world’s enormity that necessarily exceeds our finite and limited 
 
26 On hermeneutics and place, see Jeff Malpas, “Placing Understanding/Understanding Place,” Sophia, vol. 
56, no. 3, 2017, pp. 379-391. 
27 Gadamer, TM, p. 444; GW1, p. 451. 
28 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke 8, Ästhetik und Poetik I. Kunst als Aussage, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr 
(Paul Siebek), 1993, p. 345. 
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perspective becomes increasingly apparent to us. Yet Gadamer emphasizes in this 
passage how the infinite space of the universe can, nevertheless, still become a 
home for us to the extent that we accept our finitude, adjust our points of view, 
and attempt to see things as best we can from our standpoint of unavoidable and 
linguistic partiality. Gadamer suggests that the only thing equal to the infinity of 
space as modeled by modern natural science is the infinity of the dialogue that 
we are as articulated and championed by philosophical hermeneutics. Our 
infinite conversation measures up to the task of endlessly struggling to put the 
meaning of an infinite universe into words, which means no tradition or point of 
view ever enjoys a monopoly on truth. Language continually affords us glimpses 
into infinite space. 
The next, and closely related, ocular metaphor we detect in Gadamer is 
perspective, namely, the modern emphasis on the partiality of human perception. 
His central concept of the fusion of horizons (Horizontverschmelzung) contains 
consonances of perspective. Some commentators read Gadamer as a 
perspectivalist who abjures any absolute point of view.29 Indeed, he condemns an 
absolute viewpoint in the strongest possible terms: “Herein lies the limit [Grenze], 
but also the legitimacy, of all ‘practical philosophy’: namely, that it does not claim 
to raise us to the point where we can freely survey an overarching heaven of 
values; rather, it exposes the supposed search for such a thing as a self-
deception.”30 “An overarching heaven” amounts to an illusion in practical 
philosophy, where we will not find any final set of moral truths, as well as in 
theoretical philosophy, where Gadamer rejects the possibility of the view from 
nowhere of modern scientific objectivity. Gadamer’s hermeneutical theory of 
understanding takes its point of departure from the insight that we always 
approach objects of interpretation from within our own “horizon,” a concept he 
defines in explicitly ocular terms: “The horizon is the range of vision [Gesichtskreis] 
that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point. 
Applying this to the thinking consciousness [Bewußtsein], we speak of narrowness 
of horizon, of the possible expansion of horizon, of the opening up of new 
 
29 For example, see Robert J. Dostal, “In Gadamer’s Neighborhood,” Dialogues with Davidson: Acting, 
Interpreting, Understanding, J. Malpas (ed.), Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2011, p. 173. 
30 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hermeneutics, Religion, and Ethics, trans. J. Weinsheimer, New Haven, CT and 
London, Yale University Press, 1999, p. 75; Gesammelte Werke 4: Neuere Philosophie II. Probleme, Gestalten, 
Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1987, p. 202. 
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horizons, and so forth.”31 Our “range of vision,” the particular context out of 
which our understanding emerges, is always already conditioned by linguistic and 
historical traditions, or webs of signification and intelligibility, that we inherit and 
bring to our attempts to understand.  
Human vision is limited, partial, one-sided, and embodied. In construing our 
embeddedness within traditions in terms of horizons, Gadamer aligns his 
conception of understanding with that crucial perspectival insight. The fusion of 
horizons then takes place as a collision between the constellation of intelligibility 
initially possessed by the understanding person as well as the tradition embodied 
by the object of understanding. Gadamer thinks of this collision or fusion as an 
endlessly mutable conversation between person and object—text, artwork, or 
historical event—out of which my understanding dynamically emerges. He 
construes the two partners in this hermeneutical fusion in the ocular terms of 
horizons, that is, as ranges of vision that are partial and incomplete but that 
enable us to see a certain delimited field.32 The language I speak, which permits 
me to intelligibly view the world, enables me to understandingly come to grips 
with reality by handing down to me a tradition, a situated mode of intelligibly 
seeing things. Gadamer importantly invokes here the ocular metaphorical 
vocabulary of horizons and views to show that our cognitive standpoints can 
dynamically shift and change. 
I now turn to a third and final ocular metaphor in Gadamer, namely, 
mirroring, which plays an important role in his so-called speculative theory of 
language. As Donatella Di Cesare emphasizes, when Gadamer refers to language 
as “speculative [spekulative],” we should recall that “the etymology of the word 
points to speculum, a mirror that can reflect an image.”33 What connection does 
Gadamer draw between language and mirroring? Here we must begin with 
Gadamer’s doctrine that “being that can be understood is language [Sein, das 
 
31 Gadamer, TM, p. 301; GW1, p. 307. 
32 For helpful definitions of Gadamerian horizons on which I have drawn here, see Hubert Dreyfus and 
Charles Taylor, Retrieving Realism, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2015, pp. 110-111; and David 
Vessey, “Gadamer and the Fusion of the Horizons,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 17, no. 
4, 2009, pp. 538. 
33 Gadamer, TM, p. 453; GW1, p. 460. For the reference to Di Cesare, see Gadamer: A Philosophical Portrait, 
trans. N. Keane, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2013, p. 154. 
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verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache].”34 Gadamer does not mean with this 
sentence to imply an unacceptable form of linguistic idealism, although both 
sympathetic and critical commentators have construed this well-known passage 
that way.35 Rather, his philosophical hermeneutics insists only that human beings 
primarily comport themselves toward reality in an understanding manner. In 
other words, in our dealings with entities and with other Dasein, we disclose 
meaning and attempt to make sense of reality such that we can cope with it. To 
the extent that we successfully understand the meaning of things, we disclose that 
meaning by trying ever anew to put it into words for ourselves and for others. For 
Gadamer, language therefore serves an essentially mediating function: 
“Language is a medium where I and world meet or, rather, manifest their original 
belonging together.”36 We have intelligible worlds only to the extent that we 
linguistically disclose and experience things; we mediate the world through 
language. This feature of our experience makes for one half of the mediation that 
Gadamer claims in saying that “being that can be understood is language.” The 
other side of this mediation comes in the fact that the world only discloses or 
intelligibly shows itself to us through language. Since understanding means 
putting things into words, and since we only ever experience our worlds 
understandingly, then that suggests that the world shows up for us only in a 
linguistically articulable (even if not always fully articulated) fashion. Hence, for 
Gadamer, language’s speculative character means acting as the medium or site of 
the meeting that continually takes place as human beings and the world 
continually challenge each other’s claims to truth in an ongoing and active 
exchange. 
In construing this mediation in terms of speculation, Gadamer aligns his 
conception of language with metaphors of mirroring: “The word ‘speculative’ 
 
34 Ibid, p. 470; p. 478. 
35 Gianni Vattimo embraces Gadamer’s alleged linguistic idealism (The End of Modernity: Nihilism and 
Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture, trans. J. Snyder, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988, pp. 
10-12). Cristina Lafont develops a thorough and well-known objection to linguistic idealism in hermeneutics 
(The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy, trans. J. Medina, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1999, pp. 55-124). 
Even more demanding of future attention is Claude Romano’s challenging phenomenological critique of 
linguistic idealism in twentieth-century philosophy as a whole, including hermeneutics (At the Heart of Reason, 
trans. M. Smith and C. Romano, Evanston, IL, Northwestern University Press, 2015, pp. 60-61, 485-503). 
36 Gadamer, TM, p. 469; GW1, p. 478. 
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here refers to the mirror relation.”37 Language and world mirror each other. Just 
as mirror images ontologically depend on what they reflect, so too does our 
intelligible world only appear for us through linguistic mediation. We disclose the 
world through language, and the world appears to us through linguistically 
articulable experiences. To borrow one of Gadamer’s own examples, when the 
mirror image of a castle appears in the lake, that mirror image requires the 
physical fact of the castle for its existence.38 Just as artists, magicians, and scientists 
invent creative variations on the mirror, so too can our linguistic practices permit 
us to contribute novel ways of seeing and reacting to reality, never resting content 
with any single one. The metaphor of mirroring permits Gadamer to illustrate 
his conception of language as disclosing the world, and in turn for the way that 
the world requires human language and creativity in order to intelligibly appear 
to human beings. We can no more willfully impose our language onto the world, 
by for example designating names for contents that precede our linguistic acts, 
than could a mirror reflect an image without there being some real worldly entity 
that the mirror reflects. Such a case cannot, at least, be a paradigm of the human 
linguistic capacity.39 The fact that language does not merely and arbitrarily 
project or impose itself onto reality also implies, in a rebuke now of linguistic 
idealism, that just as a mirror cannot invent its own image wholesale, so too 
language does not construct the world on its own, but rather reflects and partially 
discloses a reality independent of us. The evental interplay between a mirror 
image and what the image reflects captures this complex relationship. The 
speculative happening of language recalls the intricate ontological 
interdependence between an entity and its mirror image.  
§5. “THE DENIAL OF VISION” REVISITED 
I have argued that Gadamer employs three ocular concepts in his thinking, 
namely, infinity, perspective, and mirroring. In this light, I want to revisit 
Blumenberg’s claim, in his critique of the conservatism of listening, that the 
 
37 Ibid, p. 461; p. 469. 
38 Ibid; pp. 469-470. 
39 Here I follow Charles Taylor’s convincing critique of “designative” as opposed to “constitutive” views of 
language (The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 2015, pp. 3-50). 
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reliance in hermeneutics on auditory metaphors signalled a “denial of vision.” 
The prominence of these ocular metaphors in his thinking shows that Gadamer, 
for his part, subscribes to no such denial. Blumenberg implied also that the denial 
of vision suggests a passive acceptance of tradition, whereas the activity and 
volition indicated by metaphors of seeing, which we have pointed to as playing 
such a prominent role in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, aligns with progressive 
political dimensions: “The eye wanders, selects, approaches things, presses after 
them, while the ear, for its part, is affected and accosted. The eye can seek, the 
ear can only wait.”40 Blumenberg’s political critique of hermeneutics rests, we now 
recognize, on a questionable demarcation between the volitional registers of 
hearing as opposed to vision. This point about the alleged passivity of hearing, 
which Jonas also insists on, fails to stand up to scrutiny even on, first of all, basic 
phenomenological grounds. For instance, hearing the sounds of an oncoming 
train as they echo in the tracks can permit me not only to merely and passively 
wait, but also to actively anticipate and then subsequently react to a future and 
imminent event.41 As a number of radical political theorists have emphasized, 
listening—to, for example, forms of avant-garde and politically inspirational 
music—can actively and crucially contribute to revolutionary social change.42 To 
press this same objection from the opposite direction, does not vision also 
sometimes lend itself to a form of passivity and lethargy? Such scenarios certainly 
occur whenever our eyes are drawn, as they so often seem to be today, to the 
seductive but deadening spectacles of television and computer screens and social 
media on which we dwell and from which we cannot pull ourselves away. We 
must certainly question, then, the basic phenomenological viability of the analysis 
of the senses provided by Blumenberg and Jonas that appears to politically 
problematize Gadamerian hermeneutics. Insofar as this debate about the 
volitional aspects of the senses bears on a proper interpretation of Gadamer’s 
philosophy, furthermore, I point to infinity, perspective, and mirroring as 
evidence that this volitional and active valence of perception, which finds its 
expression in those visual metaphors, also occurs in Gadamerian hermeneutics.  
 
40 Blumenberg, “Light as a Metaphor for Truth,” p. 48. 
41 The dynamic activity of hearing is borne out by scientific evidence. See Alain de Cheveigné, “Hearing, 
Action, Space,” Reasoning and Cognition, Tokyo, Keio University Press, 2006, pp. 253-264. 
42 For example, see the recent study, which draws on and enriches radical political theory from recent 
Continental philosophy in conjunction with episodes from classical music, by Naomi Waltham-Smith, Music 
and Belonging: Between Revolution and Restoration, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 2017. 
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In a surprising inversion of Blumenberg’s critique of the overreliance on 
hearing in hermeneutics, Gemma Corradi Fiumara appeals to listening as a 
feminist motif of resistance to Western masculinist logocentrism, which she 
associates with Gadamerian hermeneutics. Precisely on this count, she argues, 
Gadamer fails to pay sufficient attention to listening.43 Corradi Fiumara’s objection 
follows from the general connection suggested by other feminist writers, such as 
Sandra Lee Bartky, between listening and traditional femininity, as seen in the 
example of the sympathetic wife sensitively listening to her husband recount his 
daily concerns.44 For these feminist critics, Gadamer does not evince appropriate 
appreciation for the receptivity signaled by listening. Following Blumenberg in 
this respect, and against Corradi Fiumara, I have shown that Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics does, in fact, crucially deploy aural and auditory dimensions to 
describe our reception of tradition. Thanks to our treatment of Gadamer’s three 
ocular metaphors, however, we must also conclude that Blumenberg’s 
characterization of hermeneutics can only be, in the case of Gadamer at least, in 
fact irredeemably onesided and unfair. Gadamer by no means accepts 
Blumenberg’s simplistic and tendentious dichotomy between the auditory and the 
ocular. While Corradi Fiumara is surely right to associate listening with modes of 
receptivity, Gadamer invokes precisely that valence of hearing in his description 
of our openness to tradition; and though Blumenberg’s critique of the 
conservatism of listening perhaps does apply to writers like MacIntyre or 
Oakeshott, Gadamer escapes that objection by including so many visual and 
ocular metaphors in his writing. My reading has sought to split the difference 
between the critical reactions to Gadamer’s perceptual metaphors by 
Blumenberg and Corradi Fiumara, and in so doing, to unearth the positive 
potential of those metaphors by developing a perceptually polysemic account of 
our relation to tradition, which I think counts among Gadamer’s central 
philosophical achievements.  
 
43 Gemma Corradi Fiumara, “The Development of Hermeneutic Prospects,” Feminist Interpretations of Hans-
Georg Gadamer, L. Code (ed.), University Park, PA, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003, pp. 133-
137. 
44 Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression, London, Routledge, 
1990, p. 103. 
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In replying to Blumenberg’s critique of the anti-ocular conservatism of hermeneutics, 
allow me to cite a passage from a 1998 essay by Gadamer entitled “On Listening”: 
For all of us, we still have something to learn in listening [Hören]. Just as we must 
learn to see, which unfortunately we do not practice enough in our schools, we also 
have to learn to listen. We have to learn to listen in order not to ignore the subtler 
tones of what is worth knowing [die leiseren Töne des Wissenswerten]—and perhaps also 
obeying [gehorchen]. But everyone should think about this on their own.45 
Here, in comparing learning how to see with learning how to listen, Gadamer 
explicitly repudiates any possible imputation to him of a disjunction between the 
auditory versus the ocular. As we have shown, he considers both faculties 
important. Unlike Blumenberg and Jonas, and similar in this respect to 
contemporary analytic philosophy of perception, Gadamer at his best does not 
draw a firm and likely untenable distinction between the purported passivity of 
hearing as opposed to the activity of seeing, but rather provides an integrated 
conception of embodied human perception.46 Just as he does when describing 
hermeneutics as a form of listening, which might accord with a feminist 
philosophy of sensitive and receptive hearing, Gadamer in this passage 
underscores our need to listen, and even hints at the connection between listening 
and obedience to which Blumenberg critically called attention. I would insist, 
however, against Blumenberg’s characterization of the conservatism of listening, 
that Gadamer does not ultimately recommend an uncritical, passive acceptance 
of tradition. His call here to learn how to properly listen suggests, rather, that we 
must carefully and intentionally discriminate among our inheritances from the 
past. This task requires, first, remaining open to hearing what tradition has to say 
so that we can then subsequently think for ourselves, as he insists in the final line 
of this passage that we must do. Gadamer does not unthinkingly favor tradition, 
however, just as he does not reflexively reject the ocular. The Gadamerian cross-
pollination of auditory and ocular metaphors, which refuses to rigidly and falsely 
separate human perception between active and receptive domains or modes, 
symbolizes this dynamic, multivalent, and embodied engagement with historical 
tradition. As my reconstruction of Gadamer’s perceptual model of 
 
45 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hermeneutische Entwürfe, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2000, p. 55. 
46 See, for example, Mark Eli Kalderon’s argument for the activity of listening: “In hearing something we 
listen along with it” (Sympathy in Perception, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 
141). 
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hermeneutically engaging with tradition has shown, tradition cannot only be a 
static and mute object that we merely receive, as we would an overwhelming 
sound that we must hear. Instead, we engage with tradition in multiple registers 
and by employing several modes of critical response. Our reply to Blumenberg’s 
critique has allowed us to more fully develop, and even enrich, this crucial 
Gadamerian insight into the human relationship to tradition, a conception that 
cannot sit easily alongside any mode of passive or quietistic conservatism. 
Blumenberg also suggested, we will recall, in his reference to “an element of 
teleological trust that ‘theoretically’ cannot be justified,” that any acceptance of 
tradition would be unjustified. Replying to this very broad objection, which 
would sharply provoke thinkers who direct hermeneutical themes in the direction 
of conservative politics, may lie outside the scope of this essay. But, on the basis 
of our analysis, we can see why here Gadamer, at least, would strongly disagree. 
Gadamer calls us to engage constructively and critically with the traditions we 
inherit, including the traditions of the modern age, which saw the development 
of those paradigmatically ocular concepts whose echoes we found in Gadamer’s 
thinking. Not only do we, by virtue of our facticity, have no choice but to take 
our point of departure from tradition. The Gadamerian strategy for engaging 
with tradition, though it bears some genuine comparison with conservative 
thinking and “traditionalistic” hermeneutics, also contains authentically positive, 
because more dynamic, political promise as well. Unlike MacIntyre, Gadamer 
does not dangerously reject modernity in an overwhelmingly negative gesture, 
since his hermeneutics generously draws out the polysemic truths of modernity’s 
intellectual bequest to the present. We have seen this strategy in action here in 
Gadamer’s elevation of ocular metaphors into the register of philosophical 
hermeneutics.47 And whereas Oakeshott’s traditionalistic conservatism 
uncritically affirms our inheritances from tradition, Gadamer calls us rather to 
actively and discriminately engage with those inheritances in order to think for 
ourselves on the basis of tradition. Gadamer suggests we do so by critically fusing 
horizons with tradition in an infinite dialogue in which all partners continually 
challenge each other’s points of view and modes of disclosure. The full scope of 
 
47 I have sought to motivate this general reading of Gadamer’s treatment of modern thought and culture 
elsewhere. See David Liakos, “Another Beginning? Heidegger, Gadamer, and Postmodernity,” Epoché, vol. 
24, no. 1, 2019, pp. 221-238. 
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Gadamerian hermeneutics, which includes the auditory as well as the visual, calls 
us to engage with tradition in a spirit of generous listening—which crucially also 
includes judicious, informed, and sharp-eyed critique. In other words, Gadamer 
rejects the conservatism of listening.48 
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